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Tolerated Use
Tim Wu*

INTRODUCTION
"Tolerated use" is a term that refers to the contemporary spread of technically
infringing, but nonetheless tolerated, use of copyrighted works. Such patterns of
mass infringement have occurred before in copyright history, though perhaps not
on the same scale, and have usually been settled with the use of special laws, called
compulsory licensing regimes, more familiar to non-copyright scholars as liability
rules. This paper suggests that, in present times, a different and slightly unusual
solution to the issue of widespread illegal use is emerging-an "opt-in" system for
copyright holders, that is in property terms a rare species of ex post notice or
"safety" right. In addition, this paper proposes a different way to deal with
tolerated use problems-the "copyright no action policy."
I. THE RISE OF TOLERATED USE
Copyrighted works are today used in many ways they once were not. There is a
giant grey zone in copyright, consisting of millions of usages that do not fall into a
clear category but are often infringing. These usages run the gauntlet, from
PowerPoint presentations, personal web sites, social networking sites, church
services, 1 and much of Wikipedia's content to well-known fan guides. Such casual
and often harmless uses of works comprise the category of tolerated use, the
discussion of which is the purpose of this first section.
The critical aspect of this phenomenon are uses of works that are of a mass
quantity and low value per transaction. Copyright's property structure, like most
property systems, works best given relatively few significant uses of a given work
that are each of high value. Today's world of mass low-value infringement is
different.
The magnitude of such casual infringement is naturally hard to measure. In a
paper entitled Infringement Nation, performing what he calls a
"gedankenexperiment," Professor John Tehranian calculates the potential copyright
* Professor, Columbia Law School. Copyright © Tim Wu 2008. I wish to thank members of
Luis Villa, Douglas Lichtman, Rosa Castro, Jane Ginsburg, Scott Hemphill, the members of the Max
Planck Workshop on Commons Theory, the Columbia IP colloquium, and the 10-10 workshop for
comments. I also thank Andrew Cohen for helpful suggestions.
1. Brian D. Wassom, Copyright Infringement in Worship Services: Problems and Potential
Solutions, 36 JOURNAL OF ARTS MANAGEMENT, LAW & SOCIETY 2, 127-160 (Summer 2006).
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liability that a university professor might incur as he responds to emails,
photocopies articles, goes swimming, and recites poetry. He arrives at a
hypothetical figure of over $12 million. 2 While the hypothetical is meant to be a
bit goofy (a tattoo of "Captain Caveman" is among the sources of liability),
Tehranian makes the point clearly that beyond true piracy, casual copyright
infringement is sometimes a near-unavoidable part of many people's days.
The reason that there is such a giant grey zone in copyright today is often
discussed.3 Once upon a time, even as recently as the 1960s, it was difficult to
infringe the copyright law. One needed a printing press, a radio station, or a means
of pressing records, and such facilities were not owned by many. Today every
man, woman, corporation and child has the technological ability to copy and
distribute, and therefore to potentially infringe copyright in ways both harmful and
harmless. That ability should be celebrated, but it has created great and by now
well-known challenges for the law.
One problem is that copyright lacks a vocabulary to describe what is happening
in the 21st century. To help get a handle on what is going on, this section attempts
to clarify and classify some of the uses of copyrighting works that may have
already existed, but have emerged more prominently over the last twenty years or
4
SO.

Traditionally, we might say that copyright comprehended five main categories
of usage. They are (1) infringing use, (2) non-infringing use, (3) privately licensed
use, (4) publicly licensed, or statutory use, and (5) fair use. The first category
includes usage of a right owned by the owner of the copyrighted work without
permission. The second category includes uses of copyrighted works that are noninfringing to begin with, such as private performances, and the use of a de minimis
amount of a work. The third category includes all privately licensed use by a
person with the necessary permissions, including use, from the owner. Usage
pursuant to a compulsory license regime (like that for "cover songs") and usage
pursuant to the statutory 17 U.S.C. § 108 (archival) or § 110 (performance)
exceptions are in the fourth category, while the fifth category, which is technically
a statutory exception as well, is the broader right of fair use.
Fig 1. Traditional Categories
" Infringing Use
* Non-infringing Use
* Privately Licensed Use
* Publicly Licensed use
* Fair Use
2. See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007
UTAH L. REv. 537, 543-47 (2007).
3. See, e.g., JESSICA LITMAN, DIGITAL COPYRIGHT 111 (2000) ("Our copyright laws have, until
now, focused primarily on the relationships among those who write works of authorship and disseminate
those works to the public"); Jane C. Ginsburg, Putting Cars On The "Information Superhighway":
Authors, Exploiters, and Copyright in Cyberspace, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1466, 1488 (1995) (discussing
the role of intermediaries).
4. Cf Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REv. 347 (a
consideration of copyright's users).
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In simpler times, perhaps most use of copyrighted material might have fallen
into these categories, or at least enough so that other categories were not important.
However, since the 1970s and 1980s, when copying became something of which
individuals were capable, the usage landscape has changed.5 In the last twenty
years, some new categories of usage have developed, and here we can describe
several-some well known, other less so.
The first is implicitly licensed use. Here, usage is licensed not by explicit
contract but by an implied contract created by conduct or notice of one kind or
another. Implicit licenses are by now a familiar part of the copyright6 scene,
appearing in well-known cases like Cohen v. Effects Associates, and others.
The second is the category of tolerated use studied here.7 Tolerated use is
infringing usage of a copyrighted work of which the copyright owner may be
aware, yet does nothing about. There may be a variety of reasons for tolerating use.
Reasons can include simple laziness or enforcement costs, a desire to create
goodwill, or a calculation that the infringement creates an economic complement to
the copyrighted work-it actually benefits the owner.
As discussed earlier, parts of various fan sites and fan fiction sites that can be
easily found on the internet typify tolerated use. Take for example the fan site for
the popular TV show Lost, broadcast by ABC, which is called the "Lostpedia."
Among other things, the Lostpedia posts full transcripts of the program; such
postings are almost certainly copyright infringement. But nothing is done, not
because ABC is lazy, but because it doesn't think suing the Lostpedia is a good
idea. Such lack of enforcement against fan sites seems to represent copyright
owners' judgment that the infringing uses are complementary to the main
copyrighted products-or put more simply, that fan sites will increase, not hurt,
demand for the show.
What is the difference between tolerated use and implicitly licensed use? The
difference is legal. In the case of an implicit license you could, if brought to court,
point to some conduct or writing that creates permission to engage in the activity in
question. For example, many newspapers and magazines, such as the New York
Times, provide a way for readers to email articles. Such emailing constitutes both a
8
"reproduction" and a "distribution" of the articles under the copyright law.
However, someone sued for such emailing would have a defense: that by clearly
encouraging readers to email stories, the paper had implicitly created a contract-a
non-exclusive license - permitting the reader to email the stories to friends.
By contrast, in a tolerated use scenario, there is no such contract. Instead, the
defense, if any, is a fair use argument of some kind, an argument that the laches of

5. For a discussion of the changes in use of copyrighted works and related instances of
individual enforcement, see, e.g., Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright and Control over New Technologies of
Dissemination, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 1613 (2001); Tim Wu, Copyright's CommunicationsPolicy, 103
MICH. L. REv. 278 (2004).

6.

See, e.g., Effects Assocs., Inc. v. Cohen, 908 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 1990).

7.
For a discussion of "tolerated use," see Tim Wu, Does YouTube Really have Legal
Problems?, SLATE, Oct. 26, 2006, http://www.slate.com/id/2152264.
8.
17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
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the copyright owner should bar recovery (equity aids the vigilant), 9 or possibly a
statute of limitations defense. The main point is that that liability likely exists, but
it is simply a matter of non-enforcement. The difference from an implied contact
should be clear.
Is there a difference between tolerated use and fair use? Many of the uses that
fall into the category of tolerated use might also arguably fall close to, if not within,
the category of fair use. 10 Hence, an alternative way to describe what is happening
today is as a massive and fully legal exploitation of the fair use doctrine.
The problem with this description is that it remains unclear whether it's rightbecause we don't, in fact, know how many of the mass infringements a court would
find to be fair use. That is because, thanks to the inherent vagueness in the concept
of fair use and the costs of litigation, the contours of fair use for casual
infringement have not been-and may never be-well mapped out.11 That makes
it difficult to differentiate between use that is tolerated and use that is fair.
Take once again, for example, a typical internet fan guide. The copyright status
of such guides is tricky: some parts are almost certainly fair use; other parts
tolerated use; and other parts simply beyond the owner's control, falling outside the
section 106(2) adaptation right in the first place. Yet even if we accept a fairly
generous notion of what counts as fair use, there remain many uses of copyrighted
materials that are widespread and tolerated as opposed to fair.
By this point, I hope I have convinced you that there is a large category of
technically infringing uses of copyrighted works that is neither clearly within the
category of fair use, nor in the category of being implicitly or explicitly licensed.
The next question is what the law is doing in response.
II. NOTICE BASED PROPERTY RIGHTS
In this section, I'll suggest that one of the law's reactions to the rise of tolerated
use is to develop various systems that make parts of copyright operate in a new
way. It is the creation of "opt-in" copyright enforcement systems that requires the
owner to provide notice before the usage of a work becomes infringing. Another
way of describing this approach is a move toward an ex post notice property
system. In this section, I'll make an effort to explain what such a system looks like
and to provide some examples.
Most property rights lead to a liability at the moment of trespass, without further

9. See Kling v. Hallmark Cards Inc., 225 F.3d 1030 (9th Cir. 2000) (discussing laches in the
copyright context); see also BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 875 (6th ed. 1990) ('Doctrine of laches' is
based upon maxim that equity aids the vigilant and not those who slumber on their rights. It is defined as
neglect to assert a right or claim which, taken together with lapse of time and other circumstances
causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as bar in court of equity").
10. Fair use is a broad exception for various uses of copyrighted works that, by operation of the
statute or common law, are considered fair. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (2000). The best known examples are
matters like educational uses, the use of copyrighted materials in reporting, parodies, and so on.
11.
Things are made more complex by the fact that the fair use doctrine, reflecting its commonlaw origins, can and does evolve. A usage of a copyrighted work that was at one point infringing but
tolerated might later become a form of fair use as an adjustment to changed conditions, and vice versa.
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action necessary.' 2 In real property law, if you walk onto Blackacre without
permission, you become a trespasser at that moment.
But the pattern just described is just one possible configuration. Another
scheme is one of "notice based" property rights-whereby an intrusion only
becomes a trespass if some action is undertaken by the owner. Notice based rights
can be of two types. The first are advance notice rights, where, for example, a "no
trespassing" sign is required to convert an intrusion into a trespass. A far rarer
species, but the subject of this paper, is the ex post notice right, or the "opt-in,"
where use of the property is "safe," or not illegal, until the owner takes some
action-typically, complaining or issuing notice. At that point, continued use
becomes illegal, but, importantly, usage up to that point is excused.
Advance notice rights are relatively common in American law. In the copyright
context, for example, proper copyright notice on a work was long a prerequisite to
the creation of an enforceable right. 13 In real property, many states in rural areas
deem posting "Keep Off' or similar sentiments as a prerequisite to trespass
liability. 14 Advance notice is interesting but not the main concern of this paper.
The ex post notice right, also called an "opt-in" right or a right subject to a "safe
harbor," is a much rarer creature. These are rights that require action after trespass
to create liability-absent complaint, there is no wrong committed. As a species of
what Ian Ayres calls "dual-chooser" rights, these rights have been mainly a topic of
theoretical interest, rather like rare subatomic particles.15 Whatever the prevalence
of dual chooser rights in other contexts, over the last decade, in ways formal and
informal, copyright has in various areas begun to take on the attributes of a dualchooser regime. That is, copyright has begun in various areas to require action by
both parties to "arm" the right.
I begin with several formal examples. The first and perhaps most important
example is the16usage covered by section 512 of the Copyright Act-the DMCA
"safe harbor." Relevant to our purposes, section 512 immunizes search engines
(like Yahoo) and hosts of user-directed content (like a web-hosting site) from
copyright liability until they are sent explicit notice of the infringing use (notice)
For this reason,
and until the entity fails to take down the content subject to notice.
17
system.
takedown"
and
"notice
a
as
to
referred
is
512
section
While, technically, the users become liable at the moment they upload infringing
12. Another way to describe such rights is as "single chooser" rights. The "single chooser" and
"dual chooser" language comes from Ian Ayres. IAN AYRES, OPTIONAL LAW: THE STRUCTURE OF
LEGAL ENTITLEMENTS ch. 3-4 (2005).

13. See Copyright Act of 1909. Today, sections 104A(d)-(e) represent a vestigial notice regime.
17 U.S.C. § 104A(d)-(e) (2000). They require notice of intent to enforce a restored copyright: a global
notice filed with the copyright office, or (if the restored owner misses the global notice filing deadline)
individually-served notice is required to enforce the restored copyright against reliance parties (no notice
required as to alleged infringers who don't qualify as reliance parties). For example of notice, see supra
note 5.
14. See, e.g., Title 21, § 11-2115 of New York State Environmental Conservation Law.
15. These rights are discussed in AYRES, supranote 12.
16.
17 U.S.C. § 512 (2000).
17. For the original, judicially created takedown regime, see Religious Tech. Ctr. v. Netcom OnLine Commc'n Servs., Inc., 907 F. Supp. 1361 (N.D. Cal. 1995).

COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF LAW & THE ARTS

[31:4

content, the economically relevant actor is often the search engine or hosting firm.
And to that actor, the copyright regime has an opt-in right cast. Despite facilitating
infringement, liability does not "activate" unless and until the owner takes action
(sending notice).
A second and less well-known example concerns non-profit performance of
copyrighted works. Under the copyright statute, non-profit performances are,
subject to certain conditions, allowable unless the copyright owner objects and
serves notice. 18 Stated otherwise, non-profit organizations may safely use nondramatic works unless and until they receive notice of an objection.
A third area is orphan works. Works without an owner who can be located are
generally recognized as creating problems.
In 2006, the Copyright Office
recommended a statutory amendment to deal with the orphan works problem.19
That amendment would create another version of an ex post notice-based copyright
scheme. Provided the user performed a diligent search for the owner of a
copyright, he would be free to use a copyrighted work, subject only to a duty to
stop doing so should the actual owner reappear and demand the use of her work be
stopped. While different in some respects from our other examples, the proposed
scheme is similar in pattern, since it is designed to make use of orphaned rights
safer.
The fourth area surrounds the ongoing Google Books litigation. Google's book
search program has taken thousands of books and created a searchable database
which displays excerpts of the books.2 ° Sued by the owners of the copyrights in the
scanned books, Google has claimed a right, under the fair use doctrine (section 107
2
of the Copyright Act), to provide searchable excerpts of copyrighted works. '
Meanwhile, a relevant fact in the case is that Google will take down the work
should the owner surface and so request.
Google believes that its book program is fair use with or without its "opt-out"
feature. But a judge may think differently and make the "opt-out" a necessary
aspect of the fair use defense. If a court did so, it will have used section 107 to
create a right that requires notice to become active-in other words, an opt-in right.
The final example is the informal equivalent to the above, created by policies of
selective enforcement. As discussed under the rubric of tolerated use, most
copyright owners do not enforce their rights to anything close to the statutory limit,
particularly with respect to the adaptation right. Non-enforcement leads to a
system where non-commercial users, especially on the Internet, use the work and
only stop using if issued a cease and decease letter. Unlike the other examples, this
is not a formal opt-in right scheme, but rather an informal practice that nonetheless
creates the same result.

18.

17 U.s.c. § 110(4)(b)(3) (2000).

19.

See

UNITED

STATES

COPYRIGHT

OFFICE,

REPORT

ON

ORPHAN

WORKS

(2006),

http://www.copyright.gov/orphan/orphan-report-full.pdf.
20. For a good introduction, see Jeffrey Toobin, Google 's Moon Shot, THE NEW YORKER, Feb. 5,
2007, at 30.
21.
Eric Schmidt, Books of Revelation, WALL ST. J., Oct. 18, 2005, available at
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB112958982689471238.html.
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These five real world examples are imperfect illustrations of the legal creation of
a right that has ex post notice characteristics. (To some extent, they may represent
a quiet return of notice requirements, albeit in an unusual form, to the copyright
world, where they have been absent since 1976.)
The unusual form of the opt-in right is interesting in its own respect as a matter
of property theory. This Article does not take a strong position on whether the
arrival of ex post notice rights in copyright might be a good or bad thing. Just as
liability and property rules are useful in different scenarios, notice rights are not
universally useless or useful. Instead, the rest of this Article will try to describe
why opt-in or safe harbor regimes are becoming more common, and point out
circumstances in which such regimes might produce useful outcomes. Specifically,
this Article explores the use of safe harbor regimes as alternatives to property
and
22
liability rules-copyright's main answer to most of the problems it faces.
III. NOTICE RIGHTS IN THE CATHEDRAL
A.

PROPERTY AND LIABILITY RULES

In property theory, a property right is characterized by two characteristics
important to this Article. The first is the availability of injunctive relief The
second is liability that arises regardless of any action on the part of the property
owner. That configuration, of course, is obviously not the only way to structure a
legal entitlement. The best known alternative to the property rule just described
varies the first characteristic-the availability of injunctive relief, creating what is
23
usually called a liability rule.
The difference between a liability rule and property rule, in Guido Calabresi and
Douglas Melamed's original formulation, is in the form of relief: in a liability
regime, the trespasser is charged or may pay a fee (sometimes statutory, sometimes
set by a court) for the trespass. For example, in real property, the government may
take property so long as it pays "just compensation." In copyright, anyone has the
right to make a "cover" of a copyrighted song, upon payment of a fixed fee
24
(originally two cents per copy) to the owner of the copyright in the composition.
There is a longstanding and perhaps never-ending debate over when and where a
liability or a property regime might be the better choice. Property rules are said to
have the advantage of forcing the parties to bargain for the transfer of the right, and
to therefore facilitate transactions in an environment where transaction costs are

22. For a similar look at opt-out or opt-in systems as a type of property rule, see Oren Bracha,
Standing Copyright Law on Its Head? The Googlization of Everything and the Many Faces of Property,
85 TEX. L. REV. 1799 (2007).
23. See Guido Calabresi & Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability:
One View of the Cathedral,85 HARv. L. REV. 1089 (1972). I ignore here the fact that property rules can
also be classified as a form of liability rule with extremely high prices; high enough that few people
would pay the price to engage in the activity in question.
24. See Copyright Act of 1909, § I(e).
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low. 25 The idea is that the property right that I have in my house forces you to

bargain with me if you want to buy it, rather than going to the local government
official to see what price she might set. Liability rule advocates contest the premise
that property rights facilitate transactions, suggesting that liability rules are, in fact,
more likely to force bargaining, given the prospect of a judicial setting of the price
26
for the entitlement.
A chief advantage of property rights is the price mechanism. Since a property
system requires an individualized negotiation for every transaction, it should be
expected, in a robust market, to generate more accurate prices than a blanket price
set by government or a private rights-holding organization. To make the example
obvious, if Manhattan homes were priced by Congress at a flat fee of $1000 per
square foot, the prices might be less reflective of actual supply and demand than the
prices arrived at by private bargaining. 27 As the example suggests, liability rules
look particularly unattractive when a legislature sets a blanket price for a class of
rights that may vary in value quite a bit. A judicial liability rule, like a damage
verdict in a tort lawsuit, is still a government set price, but one more sensitive to
context.
Liability rules have obvious advantages where bargaining is likely to fail or be
very difficult. That may happen for a variety of reasons. It may be because the
parties are strangers who don't meet before the transaction (as in a car accident). It
might be that the market is thin-has too sparse a record of transactions for
effective bargaining (no one knows how much something is worth, so the
negotiations break down).28 Or, in what is almost the opposite kind of problem, a
bargaining failure can occur due to the sheer number of rights-holders, so that the
29
transaction costs of agreeing to a transfer become too high for deals to be made.
For these and other reasons a bargained-for transaction may break down, making a
property system less useful.
In the field of copyright, we find liability rules (including zero-price liability
rules, i.e., commons regimes) in a variety of these situations. Private organizations
like ASCAP create "blanket licenses" for radio stations who want to license a large
collection of songs in one transaction. The fair use system creates zero-price
liability rules (normally referred to as defenses to liability) in situations where
bargaining is likely to fail.30 For example, fair use rights are granted to parodists
based on the assumption that bargaining over a work designed to humiliate the
original author has a good chance of breaking down. Finally, over the history of
copyright, a variety of government set licensing regimes, known as compulsory
licenses, have emerged as settlements to conflicts between industries. 31 For
25.

See id. at 1106-1110; ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND ECONOMICS 100 (1988).

26. See Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining,104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
27. See, e.g., Robert Merges, Contracting into Liability Rules: Intellectual Property Rights and
Collective Rights Organizations,84 CAL. L. REV. 1293 (1996).
28. Ayres & Talley, supra note 26.
29. See Michael Heller, The Tragedy of theAnticommons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 621, 653 (1998).
30. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure:A Structural and Economic Analysis of the
Betamax Case and its Predecessors,82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600 (1982).
31. See Wu, supra note 5.
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example, cable operators have the right, on the payment of a fixed fee, to retransmit
the copyrighted content of television broadcasters. 32 The compulsory licenses,
which tend to cover scenarios with a huge number of rights, are licensed for a
single fixed price, eliminating transactional problems.
B. NOTICE RULES
In the spirit of work exploring alternatives to the choice between property and
liability rules, this Article addresses the role of notice, and in particular, ex post
notice in the structuring of entitlements. The use of notice rights can serve as a
mechanism for dealing with some of the transactional problems that liability rules
are designed to address. Like a liability rule, an ex post notice regime can
overcome certain classes of transaction cost problems-namely, and most
importantly, anti-commons problems. But more important is the possibility that
safe harbors may help solve certain types of information problems by forcing
greater disclosure of private information important for accurate valuation of an
entitlement.
In most American states, hunters have a right to hunt on unenclosed land unless
the land-owner posts a sign that says "Keep Out," "No Hunting" or something
similar. 33 Most of these laws emerged in a time when hunting was a more
economically significant activity today, and that must be kept in mind for this
discussion.
What economic purpose is served by a posting law? In a typical property rule or
liability rule scenario, the potential trespasser may be deterred by the existence of
legal liability. In the absence of a posting law, unused land that is good for hunting
might be wasted, because of uncertainty as to whether the hunting is illegal. The
notice requirement prompts the owner to disclose private information if, for some
reason, hunting on the land in question might be particularly harmful.
There may be plenty such reasons. It might be the case that the land in question
is frequently used by children to play hide-and-seek, a usage likely to be
incompatible with the hunting of wild animals with firearms. On the other hand,
there might be no reason not to let people hunt: the land may simply be held empty,
and would experience no loss in value from hunting. In either case, the owner is
the person most likely to have information bearing on the question, and the
34
requirement of incurring the costs of posting forces him to disclose it.

32. 17U.S.C.§ 111 (2000).
33. These statutes are collected in Mark R. Sigmon, Hunting And Posting On Private Land In
America, 54 DUKE L.J. 549 n.69 (2004).
34. Land-posting and other notice rules are either related to, or species of, the "dual chooser"
rules described by Paul Goldbart and Ian Ayres. See Ian Ayres & Paul M. Goldbart, Optimal
Deregulationand Decoupling in the Design of Liability Rules, 100 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2001). Typically,
property and liability rules are modeled as "single chooser" rules. Take, for example, the compulsory
license of 2 cents to record a copyrighted song. The defendant (not the owner) decides whether or not to
pay the fixed fee in exchange for the entitlement to record the song. In a dual chooser regime, as
Goldbart and Ayres write, both the original owner and the trespasser have "a potential impact on how
the entitlement is allocated." Id. at 34. The simplest example is a rule whereby both parties have to
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It is probably not accurate to describe notice regimes as an alternative to liability
or property rules. But notice regimes are targeted at the same problem-namely,
moving an entitlement to its highest and best usage. By forcing the original rights
owner to take the action of communicating notice, notice regimes can uncover
rights that are, in fact, either hold no value by their owners, or usages that are
compatible with existing usages.

C. Ex POST NOTICE

RIGHTS

Ex ante or advance notice regimes are relatively common. Copyright law, for
example, was long an ex ante notice regime. Until the passage of the 1976
Copyright Act, to obtain copyright protection, an owner was required to publish
works with proper notice of copyright protection, as described by statute.35 As
described above, in most states unenclosed land includes rights that require
postings to become active. Landlord-tenant law is fill of advance notice
requirements that activate rights, like the notice required before entering a renter's
property.
This Article focuses on a slightly more unusual notice regime-the ex post
notice system. As previously discussed, the difference is that under an ex post
regime, the owner must provide notice to the trespasser after the trespass for the
trespass to become illegal. In other words, the trespasser is in the clear, unless and
until she receives appropriate notice from the owner of the property.
At first glance, it may seem that the pattern just described is the same as a
normal property right. If a nearby baseball stadium is noisy to the level of
nuisance, I have to take action (filing a suit) to have a court issue a fine or an
injunction. The critical difference, at least as I'm choosing to describe the issues, is
that we don't usually think of filing of a complaint as an action that creates
liability: the liability is there, and the lawsuit is a form of enforcement. In our
baseball stadium example, we assume such noise is illegal at the moment it begins,
and therefore that the baseball stadium must factor that risk into its decision
whether or not to open.
Sometimes the difference between a notice regime and a normal liability or
property rule may seem irrelevant. If the trespasser is making a sizable, irreversible
investment (as in the case of the stadium), whether building is illegal at the outset
or becomes illegal later probably makes little difference. But like many rights
configurations, a regime that is useless in most contexts may be interesting or
valuable in others.
agree to the fixed price for it to become an active liability rule. Another example is a rule whereby a
trespasser gets the entitlement unless both parties agree that the entitlement should be allocated to the
plaintiff.
As Goldbart and Ayres admit, dual-chooser rules can seem "esoteric and otherwordly." Id. at 36.
While they claim otherwise, finding intuitive real world examples of such rules is not easy. For the
purposes of this Article, what matters about the dual chooser model is the notion of an entitlement
scheme as one that requires choices on the part of both the owner and trespasser to determine the
existence of legal liability.
35. See Copyright Act of 1909 §§ 10, 19,20.
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D. EXAMPLES

Here I describe two idealized scenarios where an ex post notice regime might be
useful.
The Physics Library. Consider the company PL, willing to spend up to $15
million to create a downloadable library of 100,000 academic papers published in
physics, where each paper has a separate owner. We may assume that the fair
market licensing value of 90% of the papers is 10 cents, (the "bad papers") while
the value of 10% of the papers (the "good papers") is $1000 each. At the outset,
PL does not know which papers are bad and which are good.
In a world of perfect information and zero transaction costs, the library, under
our assumptions, could be built for $10,009,000. That's $1000 paid to each of the
10,000 owners of valuable papers, and 10 cents paid to the 90,000 remaining
owners. It would therefore be built.
But if we add transaction costs and lack of information, matters change. If it
costs, on average, $100 of time and search costs to contact any individual in our
world, then (excluding licensing fees), the library will cost $10 million ($100 x
100,000 authors) to build, plus $10,009,000 in licensing fees. The cost of reaching
the author is what prevents the library from being built. This is an example of
transaction costs themselves, as opposed to licensing prices, blocking a transaction,
a problem often called an anti-commons problem.
One solution to the problem is a liability rule. If government or a private
organization 6 sets a price of $100 for the rights to each paper, no money need be
spent searching for owners. The library will cost $10 million and will be built.
That is a favorable outcome that saves $10 million in transaction costs, but it is also
a suboptimal outcome in other ways. It wastes money by overcompensating the
vast majority of copyright owners, while undercompensating others. It does all of
this because it makes the centralized informational assumption that each paper is
worth the same. In our model, there is no device for extracting better price
information.
The ex post notice, or safe harbor regime, offers a different solution to the
problem. The structure of a safe harbor allows PL to build the library first. After
the library exists, all owners who value their rights over $100 (the costs of finding
and contacting any person) will do so, and demand payment for a license to their
works (for $1000, under our assumption). Those who value their rights less than
$100 will not contact PL. The library, under these assumptions, will be built for
$10,000,000 (10,000 good papers x $1000) or slightly less than the price in a world
of no transaction costs.
The advantages of the ex post regime in this idealized example are obvious. The
owners of valuable papers are compensated at $900 ($1000 minus $100 in the
search costs they incur searching for PL), which is less than in a world of perfect
information, but more than under the compulsory licensing regime. The trick with
the safe harbor regime is that it flips the economics of transaction costs. It forces

36.

A compulsory license-like scheme, of course, can also be created by a private consortium.
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the owner to divulge private information as to the value of the right-in particular,
it makes clear whether the value of the right to the owner is less than zero.
The Addictive Program. Consider the TV producer BCA (Broadcast Company
of America), creator and copyright owner of the TV show "Island." "Island" has
millions of fans, 100,000 of whom who wish to use the content of "Island" in
various ways, such as contributions to a fan site, artwork, encyclopedias, and so on,
as well as those who would simply like to distribute the show.
To simplify things, we can assume that every proposed usage is infiinging. Of
the users, we might assume that 90,000 are good, and will voluntarily produce
content with a value of $100 to copyright owner, as marketing for the original
work, or otherwise (total of 9,000,000). 10,000, meanwhile, are bad users, who
will use the work in a way that diminishes the value of the original work by $1000,
either as a substitute for a product the owner is creating, or some kind of
tarnishment.
In a world with perfect information and no transaction costs, the copyright
owner would license the 90,000 positive uses and prohibit the 10,000 negative uses,
creating a surplus of $9 million.
In another world, we might assume the owner has two options: (1) tell all users
to stop, and (2) let all users do what they like. Neither is perfect. If the owner
forces all users to stop, he forgoes $9 million in marketing, plus the costs of
100,000 cease and desist letters, which we can assume, as above, cost $100, for a
total cost of $10 million.
Otherwise the owner can let users do what they like, gaining the $9 million in
marketing but losing $10 million in tarnishment and substitution. Given the costs
of enforcement under these assumption, non-enforcement is the better option.
What the owner wants is a relatively low cost way of distinguishing between
good users and bad users. One way is the equivalent of an opt-in regime-allowing
users to do what they like, and then trying to block the uses that are harmful, as
opposed to simply infringing. If the user is able to spend 10,000 x $100, or $1
million, chasing only the substituting users, he ends up with $9 million in
marketing, minus the million in enforcement costs, for a total of $8 million.
What I've just described is an approximation of what large copyright owners are
doing in response to many of the uses of their work: that is, tolerating most
infringement, and enforcing only as against the costly varieties. However, the trick
is to enforce without deterring complementary use of the underlying worksomething the "No Action Policy," described below, might help with.

These two examples suggest that ex post regimes may be most useful in high
volume, low value situations. Or, stated otherwise, when:
* Large number of property rights need be licensed, or large number of
uses are present; and
* The actual value of the rights or usage is known best by its owner; and
* Most of the transactions in question are of low value, negative or
positive.
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E.

PROBLEMS

There are a few problems or challenges with the ex ante notice schemes
described here. The first is scalability. The Physics Library features a just a single
user and large numbers of copyright owners. But what if there is not a single
Physics Library, but ten, or if the number of libraries becomes as large as the
number of users? In that case, the copyright owner, even if he has private
information suggesting the value of the work, himself faces disabling transaction
costs. As we let the number of libraries begin to approach infinity, the pain of
transaction costs is felt on both sides. Douglas Lichtman crystallizes this concern
by saying that "opt-out will quickly37become an expensive and futile game of
whack-a-mole for copyright holders."
This may suggest that the utility of an ex post right structure depends on
scenarios where being right about what side the bulk of the transaction costs lie on
one or another side. The Physics Library example relies on an assumption which
seems fair-that there will be far more physics papers than serious libraries.
On the other hand, sticking with the Physics library example, it also remains a
fact that each discovered use of the "good" paper earns additional revenue for the
copyright owner. So while there are transaction costs, it is worth noticing that
overcoming them leads to a payoff for the copyright owner in the scenario
described. In fact, this is the advantage of the ex post system over a liability
system: better compensation of those who hold truly valuable works.
Finally, and interestingly, when the number of infringements is large or
approaches infinity (as in the Addictive Program example), a different dynamic
takes over. Since the transaction costs of trying to license the use of hundreds of
thousands of infringers is overwhelming, it puts the owner in an ex post notice
situation whether he likes it or not.
A second and important criticism of the foregoing suggests that the models I've
used are too static, particularly as pertains to transactions costs. The point runs
something like this. It may be true that an opt-in right is useful when the
transaction costs of licensing are greater than the value of the usages in question.
However, what the discussion here ignores is the effect of the copyright system and
the choice of the rule on the transaction costs in question.
Professor Douglas Lichtman, who made this argument to me, puts it as follows:
Under current law, would-be users of a copyrighted work have a huge incentive to
find ways to lower transaction costs and in that way facilitate licensing. After all, in
many settings, the only way for a user to make his desired use is for him to overcome
the transaction cost that stands in the way of the desired transaction. Similarly, under
current law, copyright holders have an incentive to find ways to lower transaction
costs because, with lower transaction costs, a copyright holder could increase not only
the number38of licenses he signs but also his share of any surplus from each
transaction.

37.
38.

Email from Douglas Lichtman to Tim Wu (Feb. 15, 2008) (on file with author).
See id.
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The strength of this point depends on two crucial numbers: the volume and value of
usage we are talking about. In the world of valuable and infrequent proposed uses
(say, a film version of a book) there are, as Lichtman suggests, strong reasons to
want to reduce transaction costs; hence the existence of whole careers-agents-whose job is to do just that.
But in any instance where the volume of usage is large (in the millions, or even
approaching infinity) and the value of the usage is low, the relevance of dynamic
transaction costs seems to disappear. As the number of uses approaching infinity,
any transaction cost will also approach infinity. That may be too abstract: in more
concrete terms, it is hard to imagine a mechanism that preserves a negotiated
license system that costs less than $10 per use (and that seems absurdly low); when
multiplied by millions, we again face the fact that transaction costs are the
determining factor.
It is possible to imagine a non-negotiated mechanism for squeezing transaction
costs much lower-like a centralized web site with automatic licenses for sale-but
at some point that solution simply begins to resemble a liability rule. As stated
above, there is nothing wrong with using liability rules to solve transaction costs
problems, but the point of this section is to suggest that there are also other ways.

III. REDUCING THE PRESSURE ON TOLERATED USE:
COMPLEMENTS AND THE NO ACTION POLICY
The preceding discussion showed how and why copyright seems to be evolving
toward an opt-in rights system for dealing with the giant gray zone of tolerated use.
In this last section I'll discuss several alternatives to the opt-in approach that may
clarify boundaries and reduce uncertainty in different tolerated use scenarios.
A.

BETTER TREATMENT FOR COMPLEMENTS

One reason that many uses of copyrighted works are tolerated is that they cause
no harm to, and in fact help, the owner of the original copyrighted work. For
example, if I create a film that is obscure, and a fan creates a loving website for the
film that uses images from the film, it is probably the case that the fan has
infringed. Nonetheless it is also obvious that the web site creates value for the
owner of the original work. 39 In fact, many fan websites and other tolerated uses
are exactly the kind of thing that content creators pay for when it is called
"marketing."
In economic terms, what the fan has created is called a complement (as 4a
opposed to a substitute)-a good that makes another good more valuable. 0

39. See, e.g., Laura Landro, Hobbits in Cyberspace, WALL. ST. J., Mar. 21, 2000 (discussing the
relationship between New Line Cinema and Lord of the Rings fan sites).
40. See R. PRESTON MCAFEE, INTRODUCTION TO ECONOMIC ANALYsIs 2-12 (1996), available at
http://www.mcafee.cc/Introecon/IEA.pdf (providing a formal economic definition of complements and
substitutes).
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Examples are easy to describe. The sale of screws makes a screwdriver more
valuable. My coffeemaker becomes more valuable the more varieties of coffee are
available. And so on.
It is sometimes effectively argued that there are no complements to a
copyrighted work, on the theory that anything related to the original is an
adaptation owned by the initial owner, making any secondary work a substitute. In
this interpretation, for example, since a fan site is arguably an adaptation of the
original work, it does not complement (increase the value) of the original work, but
rather serves as a replacement for something that the owner has the sole right to
benefit from. Another way of putting it is to say that the fan site steals the potential
licensing revenue that the owner might generate if he were to license the right to
create a fan site.
41
The phrase sometimes used to describe this argument is "if value then right.
The problem is in its circularity: "It purports to base legal protection upon
economic value," wrote Felix Cohen, "when, as a matter of actual fact, the
economic value of a sales device depends upon the extent to which it will be legally
protected." 2 In other words, you can't have a useful conversation about how to
treat complements if you begin by denying there is any such thing.
I am not, in so saying, denying that creating an adaptation right in complements
may create incentives for authors or publishers to invest more initially. Rather, the
objection is to trying to effectively define away the idea that there are complements
to the original work, considered as a product.
My point, finally, is that a focus on complements under the adaptation or fair use
doctrines might solve some of the problems of tolerated use. 3
The first approach is to suggest that a product that is a true complement to the
original work, and not a substitute for it, simply should not be considered an
adaptation of the work under section 106(2). The textual basis for this idea is an
argument that the work is not, in fact, being "adapted, transformed or recast" when
a complement is being made, but rather that a new work (which creates new value
for everyone involved) is being created.
Take, for example, the creation of an "answer book" to the problems in a
university textbook. 44 The relationship between an answer-book and a textbook is
not unlike that of a screwdriver and screws-each makes the other more valuable,
and (unlike a substitute) no one would buy the answer book without also buying the
textbook itself For that reason, a court could rule that the answer book is not an
"adaptation" of the casebook-an answer which has the benefit of following from
the plain meaning of the word "adaptation." It also encourages the protection of
economically beneficial complements and shrinks the size of the tolerated use grey
area by clearly making the answer book legal.
41.
Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation,65 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 397,405 (1990).
42. Felix Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 CoLUM. L. REv.
809, 815 (1935).
43.
17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (adaptation right), § 107 (fair use).
44. See Addison-Wesley Pub'g Co. v. Brown, 207 F. Supp. 678 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
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Some might say that this approach strips the adaptation right of any scope. It is
true that it is in tension with some of the case law, though it is supported by some
as well.45 But in defense of the approach, I point out that the right of adaptation
between media remains-preserving such things as film rights, translations, and
book versions of a ballet, 46 all of which substitute in part for the original rather than
complement it. What would be excluded from treatment as an adaptation under
this reading of the right are works which share some content but do not share the
object of the original-like fan sites which report information about a show, but
which cannot replace the story-telling aspect of the show itself.
My suggestion is that this construction of the adaptation doctrine might prove a
useful way for reducing the pressure created by great expansion of tolerated use. It
would move much valuable secondary usage of copyrighted works into a different
category-such works would not be adaptations at all, and hence would not have to
be "tolerated". Instead, they would simply be works falling outside the ownership
of the initial creator.
Another approach is to more rigorously understand complements as generally
falling under the heading of fair use. To fully describe this idea is, unfortunately,
beyond the scope of this Article, as the fair use doctrine is complex. However, in
brief, perhaps judges should straightforwardly declare that those uses that do not
substitute for the original-and instead make the original more valuable-should
47
be considered fair use, end of story.
Today this conclusion is already occasionally reached using factors one and four
of the fair use doctrine. Courts examine the purpose of the use, with particular
interest in whether it is transformative and/or commercial. They also ask whether
the use in question will substitute for the original in the market. 48 These questions
are a way of getting at the idea that a use of the copyrighted work to create a
complementary good should be a fair use.
In the current case law, however, the approach is inconsistent and the results
often at odds with what I have suggested. While parody is protected in part
because it is not a substitute for the original work 49, the use of works for political
satire is not necessarily protected in the same way. No one has ever suggested that
satires actually damage the market for the underlying work. Rather, the argument
is that they represent a market that the original owner might license (unlike parody
where a license is unlikely), and so therefore should not be considered fair use. Or,

45. Compare Ty v. GMA Accessories, 132 F.3d 1167 (7th Cir. 1997) and Lewis Galoob Toys v.
Nintendo of Am., Inc., 964 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1992) with Castle Rock Entm't, Inc. v. Carol Publ'g
Group, 150 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 1998), Micro Star v. Formgen Inc., 154 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 1998) and
Addison-Wesley, 207 F. Supp. at 678.
46. See Horgan v. MacMillan, Inc., 789 F.2d 157 (2d Cir. 1986).
47. See Shubha Ghosh, Market Entry and the Proper Scope of Copyright 352-53 (2005),
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=569162
(presenting a related
economically-oriented discussion, including an aggressive suggestion that the focus should be on
whether or not the complement increases overall societal value instead of value to the copyright owner).
48. See, e.g., Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 590-94 (1994) (discussing
substitutes).
49. Id.
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stated otherwise, the argument is that satire is "using" the original work for some
purpose and should therefore pay for that privilege.
The objection to all of this was already mentioned: if complements to original
works are either not adaptation or treated as fair use, the author will lose income.
But it is not completely clear that that is true. By definition, the complement
increases the value of the original work, and in a world of high volume and low
value complements, in the presence of a right the transaction costs of that right may
preclude effective licensing.
The satire example helps make this point. Given that the creation of political
satire has become increasingly widespread as tools for remix have become cheaper
and easier to use, and the low economic value of most satires, it is likely that more
and more of them will fall into the "tolerated use" gray area. Use of
complement/substitute as an analytical tool for measuring fair use in these satires
would lead to more predictability for creators, and a corresponding shrinkage in the
scope of "tolerated use."
B. COPYRIGHT No ACTION POLICIES

A second, related idea for clarifying and limiting "tolerated use" is the
Copyright "No Action" policy. Here the idea is that owners of copyrighted works,
to the degree that they accept and want to encourage limited usage of their works,
can declare so to the world, allowing them to focus on only the most economically
significant infringements while increasing the certainty of those who might want to
use the works. They can do so using a "no action policy," which would describe
those uses of the works that the owner will not enforce.
Professor Michael Carroll had this idea before me, 50 and as we both point out,
the idea is borrowed from the securities law context, where the Securities Exchange
Commission issues "No Action Letters" in an effort to clear up any residual doubt
that might hamper investment. Professor Carroll, however, recommends a
government-run "Fair Use Board" to make determinations and issues letter. My
idea is simply an encouragement to private entities to issue such policies.
The goal of both is the same: is to give secondary creators some clarity and
certainty as to what they may and may not do related to a major commercial work.
It is designed to encourage secondary creativity that is both a public benefit and
adds value to the original work.
What might a No Action Policy ("NAP") look like? I envision it as a simple
posting on the web or elsewhere that details the secondary uses of a work that a
secondary author can make without gaining further permission of the owner. In

50. See Michael W. Carroll, FixingFair Use, 85 N.C. L. REV. 1087 (discussing the SEC analogy
and making a proposal for an SEC-like "Fair Use Board" which would have the power to issue No
Action letters). This government-operated proposal would be more favorable to secondary authors, but
would require new legislation and would be "non-precedental but educational"-which would create
certainty for the parties directly involved, but not for others. See id. at 1129. Contrast this with my
proposal, where no government action is needed, and certainty would be created for all users of a
particular work, but which depends on the cooperation of corporate content creators.
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legal terms, the copyright no action policy is a unilateral, non-exclusive, potentially
revocable license from the media owner to all members of the general public who
meet its terms. The No Action Policy could be specific to a given work, or could
be a blanket policy for all works owned by a given media firm.
Imagine, for example, if the NBC-Universal web site had a section called
"Policy for Fans and Secondary Authors." That section would say something like:
Policy on Fan Creations and Other Forms of Secondary Authorship
NBC-Universal will not take any action against, and encourages the
creation of works based on its copyrighted works thatfall into the following
categories:
*
*
"

Non-commercialfanfiction
Online non-commercial encyclopedias
Artwork depicting characters,so long as non-commercial

The idea obviously shares some similarities with the idea behind Creative
Commons licenses, but let me make clear a few differences. First, the Creative
Commons licenses are broader than what I have described here. Even the most
restrictive Creative Commons licenses create a right to reproduce and distribute the
work, which is a difficult thing to accept for firms to adopt whose business model
depends on the control of reproduction and distribution. Additionally, Creative
Commons licenses are, for good reason, designed to be irrevocable. A No Action
Policy could potentially be changed or revoked to adjust to changing conditions,
like a rise or fall in the profitability of the original product. Finally, Creative
Commons licenses are intentionally broad, applying to the entire public without
exceptions. A No Action Policy could be more tailored; for example, applying
only to fan sites who agree to post certain disclaimers.
In part because of these factors, Creative Commons licenses have primarily been
adopted by individual creators and small firms. They have not as of yet been
attractive to large media firms that own the vast majority of commercially valuable
copyrighted materials. It is these larger entities and more commercially valuable
works that might use a No Action Policy, in the hopes that their application to highprofile content would reduce the uncertainty and other negative side-effects of
widespread infringement and tolerated use.
CONCLUSION
When thinking about the waves of mass casual infringement that characterize
modem copyright, and the related rise in tolerated use, it helps to remember that
copyright has faced challenges like this before, and will likely face more in the
future. To succeed copyright must adapt, sometimes drastically. This Article has
described the confusion created by our age of mass copyright infringement,
described and explained how copyright holders are evolving enforcement practice
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to deal with it, and suggested a few new ways which courts and rights holders
could clarify and simplify the situation.

